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Predictive processing and extended consciousness: why the machinery of consciousness 
is (probably) still in the head and the DEUTS argument won’t let it leak outside 
 
Abstract 
Consciousness vehicle externalism (CVE) is the claim that the material machinery of a             
subject’s phenomenology partially leaks outside a subject’s brain, encompassing bodily and           
environmental structures. The DEUTS argument is the most prominent argument for CVE in             
the sensorimotor enactivists’ arsenal. In a recent series of publications, Kirchhoff and            
Kiverstein have deployed such an argument to claim that a prominent view of neural              
processing, namely predictive processing, is fully compatible with CVE. Indeed, in Kirchhoff            
and Kiverstein’s view, a proper understanding of predictive processing mandates CVE. In            
this essay, we critically examine Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s argument. Our aim is to argue in               
favor of the following three points. First, that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s emphasis on             
cultural practices lends no support to CVE: at best, it vindicates some form of content               
externalism about phenomenal content. Secondly, the criteria Kirchhoff and Kiverstein          
propose to identify a subject’s phenomenal machinery greatly overgeneralize, leaving them           
open to a “consciousness bloat” objection, which is an analog of the cognitive bloat objection               
against the extended mind. Lastly, we will argue that the “consciousness bloat” problem is              
inbuilt in the very argumentative structure of the DEUTS argument. We will thus conclude              
that, contrary to the philosophical mainstream, DEUTS is not the best argument for CVE in               
the sensorimotor enactivists’ argumentative arsenal. 
 
Keywords: ​Predictive Processing, Free Energy Principle, Markov Blankets, Extended         
Consciousness, Sensorimotor Enactivism.  
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1 - Introduction 
The extended mind thesis, or ​vehicle externalism​, is the claim that, at least sometimes, the               
material vehicles of mental processes are physically located outside a subject’s biological            
shell (Hurley 2010; Clark 2013: 192-193). In this view, the physical machinery of the mind               
is, at least sometimes, distributed between brains, active bodies, and worldly props.            
Importantly, the scope of vehicle externalism is typically restricted to sub-personal cognitive            
processing and personal, but dispositional, mental states. (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark            
2008). 
Sensorimotor enactivism goes a step further, endorsing vehicle externalism about          
phenomenally conscious states (CVE), in particular perceptual ones.​1 According to          
sensorimotor enactivists, perception is something an ​embodied agent achieves ​through          
sensorimotor interactions with its environment​, such as saccading over a target to explore its              
visual features, or by squeezing a sponge to feel its softness (No​ë 2004, 2009)​. In this view,                 
the ​sensorimotor contingencies (i.e. law-like linkages between bodily movements and          
changes of sensory stimulation) determine the phenomenal qualities of experiences (see           
Hurley and No​ë 2003; O’Regan 2011, 2012)​, which, in turn, are brought about, or enacted,               
by the agent’s sensorimotor interactions. Importantly, these interactions enact phenomenal          
qualities insofar as they are guided by the agent’s ​sensorimotor mastery​, that is, the agent’s               
practical knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies. Hence, on the view sensorimotor          
enactivists offer, the phenomenal machinery of perception includes, as constituent parts,           
agent-environment interactions, and not just the neural processes enabling them (O’Regan           
1 Some linguistic stipulations: in the following, the unqualified term “consciousness” will be used as a synonym                  
of phenomenal consciousness. Similarly, the unqualified term “perception” will refer to phenomenally rich             
perception. We will also use the phrase “phenomenal machinery” and “phenomenal circutery” to refer              
collectively to the material vehicles of conscious states. Notice further that, in this paper, we will only consider                  
the sensorimotor enactivists’ version of consciousness vehicle externalism, and “CVE” will only refer to it. Our                
arguments do not impact other forms of CVE, such as the one presented in (Vold 215). 
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and No​ë 2001a; 2001b;​ ​Kiverstein and Farina 2012; Ward 2012; Pepper 2014). 
CVE strikes many as an implausible, if not unpalatable, thesis; and it has thoroughly been               
attacked in the philosophical literature (Horgan and Kriegel 2008; Clark 2009; Chalmers            
2019). As if philosophical counterarguments weren’t enough, CVE is also put under            
significant pressure by the neurocomputational framework of predictive processing (PP). This           
is because PP seems able to re-cast sensorimotor contingencies in purely ​neural terms, as part               
of the knowledge encoded in a neurally realized generative model (Clark 2012; Seth 2014;              
Pezzulo et al. 2017; Baltieri and Buckley 2019). By doing so, PP poses an important threat to                 
CVE.​2 For, if an agent’s mastery of sensorimotor contingencies is a purely neural affair, and               
if sensorimotor contingencies only mediate ​neural activities, then there seems to be just ​no              
reason to endorse CVE. 
In a series of recent publications, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a; 2019b; 2020) have set              
off to revise this dialectical situation. Their aim is to show that PP and CVE are compatible,                 
if not to show that, once properly understood, PP ​mandates CVE.​3 To do so, they carefully                
analyze the conceptual apparatus of PP, and use it to formulate the most potent argument in                
favor of CVE in the sensorimotor enactivists’ arsenal; namely the DEUTS argument (see             
Clark 2009; 2013: 222-225; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: Ch. 3). 
Our aim here is to evaluate Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s endeavor. We will argue that their               
proposal, as a whole, fails because of three distinct reasons; namely: 
(1) Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s emphasis on cultural practices offers no support to CVE. 
(2) Their way to identify the machinery of consciousness leads to a “consciousness bloat”             
problem, formally identical to the “cognitive bloat” problem plaguing the extended           
2 Importantly, when issues regarding CVE are left aside, PP and sensorimotor enactivism have a far less hostile                  
relation both conceptually (e.g. Vázquez 2020) and empirically (e.g. Laflaquiere 2017; Leinweber ​et al​. 2017). 
3 ​In all fairness, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein never state the point explicitly. Yet, this is entailed by their position.                   
In fact, they hold that, properly understood, the mechanism responsible for PP is always realized widely by an                  
agent-environment coupled system (see Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: Ch. 3, see also Kirchhoff 2015). They               
also hold that that mechanism just is the relevant phenomenal machinery (e.g. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a:                
104). This straightforwardly entails that a properly understood PP is committed to CVE, and that if PP is correct,                   
then CVE must also be correct. 
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mind 
(3) The “consciousness bloat” is inbuilt in DEUTS, as the argument is structurally            
incapable of discriminating background causes impacting the phenomenal machinery         
from candidate external constituents 
We will thus conclude that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s endeavor fails to secure a happy              
marriage between CVE and PP, and that, contrary to a popular opinion, the DEUTS argument               
is ​not​ the best argument to secure CVE. 
We’ll work as follows: in the next two sections, we will sketch PP and Kirchhoff and                
Kivertein’s position respectively. In section four, we will turn from exposition to criticism,             
articulating our three claims. A brief conclusion will then follow. 
 
2 - Predictive processing and the free-energy principle: a quick introduction 
PP is a neurocomputational framework providing a process theory to Friston’s free energy             
principle (Friston and Stephan 2007; Hohwy 2020). Here, we provide an hyper-concise            
introduction to both, starting from the latter.​4 
The free energy principle states that biological self-organization obeys a simple           
imperative; namely that of minimizing ​surprisal - an information theoretic quantity roughly            
measuring the unexpectedness of sensory states, given the sensory states that an organism             
should expect to occupy to keep itself within its own biological bounds of viability (Friston               
2012a; 2013; 2019). 
Organisms, however, cannot quantify surprisal directly. Yet, they can evaluate its upper            
bound, which is (variational) free energy (Friston 2009). Free energy is an upper bound on               
surprisal because it can be understood as surprisal plus a second, ​always positive​, quantity,              
which is the Kullback-Leibler Divergence (D​KL​): a measure of how much the system’s             
4 ​ For more introductory material, see (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2016; Tani 2016; Wiese and Metzinger 2017). 
DEUTS FAILURE 5 
“beliefs” on the causes of its states are aligned with reality. Since surprisal is also the                
complement of model evidence (Friston 2019: 177), minimizing it amounts to producing the             
evidence in favor of one’s model​5 of one’s prolonged existence. Surprisal-minimizing           
systems are self-evidencing systems (Hohwy 2016): systems that strive to bring about the             
evidence favoring the hypothesis that they exist, thereby prolonging their existence. 
In this context, models should be understood as the set of states enclosed by a Markov                
Blanket (e.g. Hohwy 2017; Friston ​et al​. 2020).​6 Formally speaking, a Markov Blanket is the               
set of nodes that, within a graph, makes the target node (or set of nodes) conditionally                
independent from any other node of the same graph (Pearl 1988: 97). Within the PP               
literature, however, they are used to determine the functional boundary that separates an             
organism from its environment and allows the organism to interface with it (e.g. Friston              
2013).​7 
Markov Blankets can be decomposed into ​active and ​sensory ​states. Active states are             
influenced by internal and sensory states, and influence the environment. Sensory states are             
influenced by active and environmental states, and influence internal states (Friston ​et al​.             
2020).​8 
Markov Blankets are multiple and nested. Every biological system can be decomposed in             
sub-systems and might partake in larger systems, and each of those systems will have its               
own Markov Blanket: Markov Blankets can thus be individuated at every possible level of              
5 ​We are purposefully vague on how “models” should be understood. On internalist and representationalist               
readings of PP, models should be understood as ​structural representations encoded in the agent’s brain (Kiefer                
and Hohwy 2018; 2019). Conversely, according to enactive accounts, models should be understood as              
“entailed” by the embodied activity of an organism (Ramstead ​et al​. 2020; see also Friston 2012a: 2111 for a                   
fromal definition of entailment). The only relevant point for our argument is that models are ​identified through                 
their Markov Blankets. 
6 Bluntly put, the states enclosed by a Markov Blanket constitute a model of the “external” states because they                   
can be mathematically described in two equivalent ways: either by their intrinsic dynamics, or as encoding a                 
family of probability distributions over external states. See (Parr ​et al​ 2019; Friston ​et al​. 2020: 9-12). 
7 Notice that this “transmutation” of Markov blankets from formal properties of graphs to functional boundaries                
of living and cognitive systems is far from metaphysically innocent (see Bruineberg ​et al​. 2020). 
8 In (semi) formal terms, active states are the children of the blanketed node, whereas sensory states are the                   
parents of the blanketed node. Whether co-parents of the blanketed node should be interpreted as active or                 
sensory states is unclear (see Bruineberg ​et al​. 2020). 
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description (e.g. Kirchhoff ​et al​. 2018) 
The free energy principle can be related to PP noticing that free energy can be equated                
with ​prediction error (e.g. Friston 2005; 2009; Buckely ​et al​. 2017), a well-known neural              
signal posited by predictive coding accounts of neural functioning (e.g. Mumford 1992; Rao             
and Ballard 1999; Spratling 2017). 
On the view PP offers, the mammalian central nervous system is a generative model which               
recapitulates how sensory signals are produced by their environmental causes.​9 Such a model             
is ​generative​, as it can endogenously generate, in a top-down manner, the sensory signals it               
expects to encounter. For instance, when the agent looks at a carrot, the model will predict                
orange sensory signals in the visual modality. 
The predicted sensory signals are then contrasted with the signal actually received,            
quantifying the prediction error: a signal which traverses the cortex “from the bottom-up” and              
that brains are tasked with minimizing. It can be minimized in several ways. First, brains can                
revise their predictions, accommodating the incoming signal. This corresponds to perceptual           
recognition (Hohwy 2013: Ch. 1 and 2; Clark 2016: Ch, 1), which is associated with a                
decrease of D​KL ​(Wiese and Metzinger 2017). Secondly, brains can minimize prediction error             
through attention, decreasing the impact on neural processing of prediction errors by            
lowering the signal precision (Hohwy 2013: Ch. 3; Clark 2016: Ch. 3). Heuristically, this is               
equivalent to ignoring noisy and unreliable prediction errors. Lastly, the brain can minimize             
prediction error by changing the incoming signals ​through movement (Hohwy 2013: Ch.4;            
Clark 2016 Ch.4). If one’s brain predicts the sensory signals related to carrots, one good way                
to make these predictions come true is by looking for a carrot. This is ​active inference​, and                 
minimizes surprisal ​directly​, as it directly changes the states of the organism.​10 
9 ​Notice that, on the view PP offers, an animal’s body ​is an environmental cause, as it is an extra-neural                    
producer of sensory signals (e.g. limb position, heartbeat rate, state of the skin, etc.) 
10 Notice: the fact that organisms cannot evaluate surprisal does not entail they cannot minimize it. Compare: we                  
cannot evaluate the number of hair on our heads, but we can surely change that number by pulling some hair off. 
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Crucially, active inference is performed by predicting, and then canceling out, the sensory             
consequences of one’s movement (Friston 2011; Namikawa ​et al​. 2011; Adams ​et al​. 2013).              
Hence, on the account of action predictive processing offers, to perform a movement ​m an               
agent must first predict the sensory outcomes ​m​; and then cancel out the prediction error               
generated by those predictions. But the sensory outcomes of ​m are just the sensory states the                
agent would encounter, were ​m performed. Hence, on the account of action PP offers, the               
agent must know how actions systematically impact the incoming sensory stream; that is, the              
agent must ​know the relevant sensorimotor contingencies, and exert their mastery by            
predicting a “desirable” stream of sensory inputs.​11 
Notice, however, that, on the view PP offers, an agent’s mastery of sensorimotor             
contingencies is a purely ​neural affair (Clark 2012; Seth 2014). And, in fact, contrary to               
sensorimotor enactivism, PP offers an indirect view of perception, in which perceptual targets             
are ​inferred ​through prediction error minimization (Frith 2007; Hohwy 2013; Wiese 2018;            
Drayson 2018). Thus, PP appears to adhere to a strong form of vehicle internalism: prediction               
error minimization is an entirely neural affair, taking place within the Markov Blanket             
constituted by the primary sensorimotor cortices (Hohwy 2016; 2017). 
Importantly, however, PP is ​not ​a theory of consciousness (Seth and Hohwy forthcoming),             
even if it seems able to account for at least some structural aspects of consciousness (Hohwy                
2013; Clark 2016: Ch. 7; Seth and Tsakiris 2018). Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, however, seem              
to take PP as a theory of consciousness. For instance, they write: 
“Predictive processing tells us what the parts of the system must be doing such              
that when these parts are organised in the right way, they constitute            
consciousness. The parts of the system will include, for instance, components           
that perform predictions, error calculation, precision estimation, and so on.” 
(Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 104). 
11 In non PP models, the sensory consequences of one’s actions are computed by ​forward models​: special                 
purpose generative models responsible for reafference cancellation (Pickering and Clark 2014). Importantly,            
forward models have provided one of the first computational implementation of an agent’s sensorimotor              
mastery (see Maye and Engel 2013) 
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We concede the point for the sake of argument. Importantly, on Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s              
own view, only ​temporally thick generative models qualify as consciousness supporting           
(Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 106-108, see also Hobson and Friston 2014). For our             
purposes here, it is sufficient to say that a generative model is temporally thick ​if it                
periodically revisits the same set of states (e.g. if it enables one to celebrate one’s birthday on                 
an annual basis, see Friston 2018: 5-6). 
But what are temporally thick generative models ​made of​? What are ​the material bits (i.e.               
the vehicles) constituting them? The PP account seems to suggest that these vehicles are              
squarely located within brains. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein disagree. Let us see why. 
 
3 - The DEUTS argument, twenty(ish) years later 
“DEUTS” stands for “Dynamical Entanglement and Unique Temporal Signature”.         
According to Clark (2009; 2013), it is the strongest argument for CVE, and Kirchhoff and               
Kiverstein (2019a: 36) concur. As we understand it, DEUTS is a two stepped argument. Here,               
we briefly present each step in its original variant, followed by Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s PP               
rendition of it. 
 
3.1 - Dynamical Entanglement 
Cognitive processing woves agent and environment together in a single system. This idea             
stems from dynamical views of cognition, according to which cognitive processing is not             
“sandwiched” between perception and action (Hurley 2001), but rather ​constituted by           
sensorimotor interactions. These interactions are better explained using the formal tools of            
dynamical system theory (e.g. Hurley 1998; Chemero 2009; Hutto and Myin 2012) which             
allow to quantitatively model and predict these interactions. This explanatory methodology,           
however, often forces one to model agent and environment as a single (non-decomposable)             
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coupled system, the evolution of which accounts for the production of cognitive outputs             
(Lamb and Chemero 2018). The non-decomposability of the agent-environment system          
causally woves the agent into the environment, and is said to vindicate a form of ​cognitive                
vehicle externalism (Palermos 2014; Kiverstein 2018).​12 How can this dynamical image of            
(extended) cognition be related to PP?​13 
First, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein argue that prediction error minimization is a tool servicing             
surprisal avoidance. But surprisal can be avoided only through active inference; that is,             
embodied action. Thus within PP, real, embodied action is central to cognition (Kirchhoff and              
Kiverstein 2019a: 57-59). 
Secondly, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein notice that albeit Markov Blankets functionally          
separate agent and environment, they also ​enable the coupling of the two (Kirchhoff and              
Kiverstein 2019a: 65-67; see also Fabry 2017).​14 This is due to the interplay of the active and                 
sensory states that jointly constitute the blanket. Recall: active states ​influence sensory and             
external states, and are ​influenced by ​internal states. Conversely, sensory states ​influence            
active and internal states, and are influenced by external states.​15 Thus, together, active and              
sensory states enable internal and external states to interlock in a ​two way interaction, which               
is a form of coupling. Importantly, this form of coupling can be accounted for by the formal                 
tools of dynamical system theory in terms of ​generalized synchrony (Friston 2013;            
Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Bruineberg ​et al​. 2018a; Kirchhoff and Robertson 2018;            
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 108-110; 2020 ​ft​. 3). 
In third place, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a: 73-76; 2019b) stress that Markov            
12 Importantly, the idea that cognition extends when cognitive outputs are jointly produced by a coupled agent                 
environment system traces back to Clark and Chalmers (1998: 8-9). 
13 Notice, importantly, that the free energy principle allows for a straightforward dynamicist treatment              
(Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Tani 2016), which can be extended to PP (Friston and Kiebel 2009). 
14 This is not a contested point in the PP literature: even the staunchest internalists concede that Markov                  
Blankets couple agent and environment (and that this is a nomological necessity; see Hohwy 2017) 
15 Notice, importantly, that sensory and active states influence each other, and are thus coupled. This, on                 
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s (2019a: 69) view, allows Markov Blankets to capture the idea of sensorimotor               
contingencies. 
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Blankets are not just multiple and nested, but also malleable and plastic. To do so, they                
extensively rely on Clark’s (2017) metamorphosis argument. Clark invites us to consider            
metamorphic insects, and the functional boundary (i.e. the Markov Blanket) that separates            
them from the environment. As the insect undergoes the metamorphic process, it            
re-negotiates that boundary, shifting the set of states that separates it from the environment              
(trivially, the silk a cocoon is made of is not the skin of the caterpillar). But if this is correct,                    
then Markov Blankets can be “moved around”; and thus the Markov Blanket that identifies              
our cognitive system can shift, when the appropriate conditions are met. 
Consider the former point in the light of the coupling Markov Blankets enable. If an agent                
can be dynamically entangled with an external resource, they form a single coupled             
dynamical system. And if such a system avoids surprisal (e.g. Bruineberg 2018b) it will be a                
free energy/prediction error minimizing system in its own right, with its own Markov             
Blanket. In such a case, the coupled system will be identified through a “wider” Markov               
Blanket, encompassing “smaller” coupled Markov Blankets. As the relevant form of coupling            
at play is generalized synchrony, the “wider” blanket will be a Markov Blanket encompassing              
smaller Markov Blankets falling into generalized synchrony. In Kirchoff and Kiverstein’s           
(2019a: 79-81; 2019b) view, such a Blanket identifies the relevant cognitive machinery; that             
is, the self-evidencing model engaged in prediction error/free energy minimization. By           
default, such a model encompasses the entire organism body, but, as the metamorphosis             
argument purportedly shows, it can extend, allowing the creation “on the spot” of extended              
free energy/prediction error minimizing systems. On the assumption that free          
energy/prediction error minimization amounts to cognition​16​, thus, PP allows for extended           
cognitive systems. 
Notice that nothing, in the picture just sketched, entails CVE. Surely, Kirchhoff and             
16 One author finds the assumption debatable, ​especially when it regards free energy. But the author is                 
nevertheless eager to concede the point for sake of discussion. 
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Kiverstein (2019a: 104; 2020: 2) are eager to identify prediction error/free energy            
minimization with cognitive ​and conscious processing.​17 But such an identification is surely            
disputable: PP ​just isn’t a theory of consciousness (Seth and Hohwy forthcoming). Moreover,             
one can surely concede that whereas the Markov Blanket of the cognitive system extends in               
the way just seen, the Markov Blanket of the ​phenomenal machinery does not. Maybe ​that               
Markov Blanket always surrounds the brain only. This is just a Markov Blanket-based             
rendition of an important point raised by Clark (2009): vehicle externalism about ​cognition             
does ​not entail CVE. And the argument based on dynamical entanglement only ensures (if it               
works) vehicle externalism about cognition. 
At this junction, reflections on the unique temporal signature of our experience kick in,              
supposedly showing, ​contra Clark, that the dynamical avenue to vehicle externalism about            
cognition ​entails​ CVE. 
 
3.2 -  Unique Temporal Signature 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the machinery of consciousness is purely neural. If               
this supposition is correct, and if neural states are kept constant, a subject’s phenomenology              
will be constant, ​regardless of what is going on in the environment​. Thus two subjects can be                 
neural and phenomenal duplicates ​without being environmental duplicates. This is the           
familiar intuition behind brains in a vat.​18 However, this intuition is wrong when it comes to                
consider the temporal evolution of the phenomenal states of dynamical entangled subjects. Or             
so Hurley (1998: Ch. 8) argues. 
To see the reason for this denial, consider a simplified rendering of one of Hurley’s (1998                
303-314) thought experiments. On earth, subject S is in an entirely withe room. The room               
contains only S and a black ball at S’s right. On twin earth, subject TS (i.e. S’s twin) is in the                     
17 And, in general, dynamicists are eager to identify cognitive processing with conscious processing (e.g.               
Silberstein and Chemero 2012; Kiverstein 2016). 
18 Or, has Hurley (1998; 2010) used to call it, this is our pre-theoretical “pluggability intuition”. 
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exact same situation. It seems correct to say S and TS are experiencing the same thing: what                 
it feels like to be in a white room with a black ball at one’s right. Importantly, S and TS are                     
phenomenal, neural and environmental duplicate. 
Now, can S and TS be phenomenal and neural duplicates ​without being environmental             
duplicates, as vehicle internalism about consciousness suggests? The answer is positive: it is             
sufficient to, say, switch the place of TS’s ball from right to left and insert in TS’s eyes                  
left-to-right inverting lenses, to keep the visual input TS receives constant. In this case, it               
seems correct to say that TS will experience the exact same thing S experiences. So S and TS                  
can be neural and phenomenal duplicates ​without​ being environmental duplicates. 
But that is possible only because S and TS are not dynamically entangled with their               
environment (Hurley 1998: 327). Thus, suppose that S and TS try to touch the ball when                
they’re not environmental duplicates. They will move their right arms towards the ball (which              
they both see at their right) and then their phenomenal (and neural) states will diverge. For S                 
will touch the ball, whereas TS will not. So S’n neural state will be modified by the reafferent                  
signal (whereas TS’s won’t), and, as a result, S will experience what it is like to touch a ball                   
(whereas TS won’t). In this case, duplication ​fails​. 
To allow for the experience ensuing from the dynamical entanglement of S to be              
duplicated in TS, one needs to make S and TS ​environmental duplicates​; that is, one has to                 
remove the lenses from TS’s eyes and displace TS’s ball in its original position. Only in this                 
case S’s experience can be duplicated in TS. So, in order for the phenomenology of a                
dynamically entangled agent to be duplicated, it is not sufficient that the subject and its twin                
are neural duplicates. They also ​need to be environmental duplicates. But what needs to be               
tokened in order for a mental content (in this case, a phenomenal content) to occur is the                 
vehicle of said content. And, in the example just considered, what needs to be “tokened” for                
the relevant phenomenal contents to occur includes at least some environmental factors.            
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Hence, if a subject is dynamically entangled, environmental factors are part of the vehicles of               
its consciousness (Hurley 1998: 330-335). The relevant phenomenal machinery is what           
Hurley (1998: 2) dubbed a ​dynamical singularity​: a singular structure, in the field of causal               
flow, characterized through time as a tangle of numerous feedback loops of varying temporal              
orbits. ​Contra​ Clark (2009), dynamical entanglement entails CVE. 
As we understand them, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a: 112-115; 2020: 5-9) make            
essentially the same point. Importantly, however, they would emphasize the role of the             
cultural environment in the constitution of one’s experience (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein           
2019a: Ch. 5 and 6; 2020). This is because they adhere to a “third wave” form of vehicle                  
externalism. In this view, the cognitive (and phenomenal) machinery has no fixed properties.             
Rather, its properties are constantly transformed by the cultural practices it participates to,             
and these properties have to be constantly negotiated by engaging with the surrounding             
cultural niche (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: Ch. 5; 2020, see also Kirchhoff 2012).             
Cognitive and phenomenal systems are thus enculturated, in the sense that their participation             
to cultural practices and their attunement to their cultural niches transforms them and alters              
their properties. 
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein hold that cultural practices are so important that they can be said               
to, in a sense, assemble the cognitive/phenomenal machinery. As they write: 
“the assembly of cognitive systems is not always orchestrated by the individual            
agent but is sometimes distributed across a nexus of constraints, where some            
constraints are neural, some are bodily, and some are environmental”          
(Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 16) 
In more vehicular terms, the claim seems to be that cultural practices “assemble” the              
cognitive system insofar as they contribute to determine the ​expected precision of the             
incoming sensory signal. That is, they contribute to create a system’s expectation for certain              
very precise streams of prediction error, which enable an agent to quickly deploy its own               
embodied skills to effectively cope with some relevant environmental contingency (Kirchhoff           
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and Kiverstein 2019a: 94-100). Importantly, these cultural practices shape more or less            
directly one’s subjective experience. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein provide a variety of examples            
of this. One is the ability, of appropriately enculturated subjects, to see certain stars in the                
Ursa Major constellation as “pointer stars”, and use them to find Polaris (Kirchhoff and              
Kiverstein 2019a: 96-97). Here, the expected precision of the incoming sensory input allows             
one to “parse” the relevant visual information, allowing the expert star-watcer to construct a              
flow of significant visual information around which subsequent actions can be organized. Or             
consider the way in which learning a language allows to recognize certain soundwaves as              
well-defined phonemes, and how such an ability impacts one’s phenomenology (Roepstorff           
et al​. 2010).​19 Another language related example involves the learning and mastery of a rich               
vocabulary of color terms, which seems to make subjects faster in discriminating hues of              
color (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 98; Thierry ​et al.​ 2009). 
Importantly, In Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s view the culturally-leaden modification of          
conscious experience is not due to the acquisition of specific neural representations. Rather, it              
is due to the constant agent-environment interaction; and cultural practices should be seen as              
elements regulating the behavior of the agent-environment coupled system: 
“[...] rule, principle and standards - the patterns of cultural practice - can be              
thought of as a macroscopic order parameters that evolve over longer           
timescales” (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2020: 7).  
Thus, if we understand Kirchhoff and Kiverstein correctly, we should not think of             
enculturated brains as regular brains supplied with culturally determined representations.          
Rather, we should think of them as nodes in a complex web of loopy causal relations, which                 
are constantly transformed by the culturally shaped loops traversing them. 
We end our exposition of Kirchhoff and Kiverstein complex position here, mainly owing             
19 Strikingly, this case is often used as a prime example of so-called “cognitive phenomenology”; that is, the                  
phenomenal facet of cognitive (non-sensory) mental states, see (Horgan and Tienson 2002). 
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to space limitations. We acknowledge that our summary is incomplete​20​, and that it does not               
convey the entire depth of Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s overall position. But we think this              
emaciated summary is enough, for us, to articulate our counter-arguments. 
 
4 - Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s defense of consciousness vehicle externalism: three           
problems 
 
4.1 - Cultural practices do not seem to support consciousness vehicle externalism 
Recall: CVE is the claim that the phenomenal ​machinery is not entirely located within a               
subject’s brain. CVE makes a claim about the ​vehicles of a subject’s experience: the ​material               
carriers of a subject’s phenomenal contents. Now, in the philosophical literature vehicles are             
typically identified as ​concrete particulars​: that is, physical, individual entities (e.g. Shea            
2018: 10; Smortchkova ​et al​. 2020: 2). But cultural practices (e.g. the practices of writing,               
performing human sacrifices, or playing football) do not seem to be concrete particulars.             
They do not look like vehicles. As such, it is very doubtful that they qualify as external                 
vehicles​ of a subject’s consciousness.​21  
Perhaps focusing on a concrete case might clarify ​how cultural practices function as             
external vehicles of subjective experience. Thus, consider the experiment performed by           
Thierry ​et al​. (2009), which Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a: 98-99) propose as evidence of              
the fact that cultural practices support CVE. 
The study (Thierry ​et al​. 2009) involved two groups of participants which spoke two              
different native languages; namely English and Greek. Participants of both groups performed            
20 We have been silent, for instance, on Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s complex proposal of a diachronic account of                  
constitution, and we have glossed over a variety of themes proposed in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s book.  
21 Of course, cultural artifacts used for and produced by cultural practices (e.g. written pages, sacrificial knives,                 
soccer-balls) are concrete particulars, and ​can be external vehicles of a subject’s mental machinery. This claim                
is as old as the “extended mind” itself. So it seems to us that, if Kirchhoff and Kiverstein are proposing a new,                      
radical, “third wave” form of vehicle externalism they cannot be claiming ​just that​. 
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the same taks: participants were required to perform an odball stimulus discrimination. More             
in detail, the stimulus was a sequence of squares, and the oddball was a circle. Participants                
had to press a button as soon as they noticed the circle. Notice that the stimuli were presented                  
at a fixed rate, hence participants could not influence the way stimuli were presented. The               
neuronal activity of each participant was captured through an EEG cap. 
Here’s the crucial bit of the experiment: albeit participants were required to discriminate             
shapes​, stimuli could also vary in ​color​. In total, for color were used: light and dark blue and                  
light and dark green. Notice that the variation in color is ​entirely task irrelevant​: if, say, a                 
yellow stimulus suddenly appeared, participants were ​not expected to press the button (unless             
the stimulus was a circle).​22 Now, there is a crucial difference between English and Greek               
native speakers when it comes to the colors. Whereas both English and Greek use a single                
word for green (whether dark or light), only English uses a single word for blue. Greek uses                 
two: ​galazio​ (dark blue) and ​ble​ (light blue). 
Thierry and colleagues found that the ​early visual cortex of Greek (and only Greek) native               
speakers responded differently to the two task irrelevant shades of blue. Both English and              
Greek native speakers respond in the same way to the two shades of green. The researchers                
concluded their data support the claim that color terminology can influence early visual             
processing. 
We must confess that we simply do not see ​how this experiment is supposed to bolster                
CVE. Let us start with consciousness. The experiment does ​not establish that Greek and              
English native speakers experience color differently. As The experimenters write, their data            
speaks only of a “[...] relationship between native language and ​unconscious​, preattentive            
color discrimination rather than simply conscious, overt color categorization” (Thierry ​et al​.            
2009: 4568; ​emphasis added​). Moreover, whether early visual cortices qualify as neural            
22 The yellow stimulus example is ​just an example​ for the sake of clarity. No yellow stimulus was actually used. 
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correlates of consciousness is still a matter of debate (Chalmers 2000; Blake ​et al. 2014;               
Koch ​et al. 2016), so it is at least in principle possible that color terminology only influences                 
non conscious​ visual processing. 
Let us now move to vehicle externalism. What are the relevant external vehicles that              
should “extend the mind” here? There are empirical studies that try to assess the impact of                
external objects on cognitive processing (e.g. Vallé-Tourangeau ​et al. 2016; Bocanegra ​et al​.             
2019), and these studies can be used to offer empirical support to vehicle externalism. But in                
these studies experimenters take a great care in describing the “external vehicles” involved,             
and what sort of effects they might have on cognizing. Thierry and colleagues do nothing of                
that sort. And they do so ​rightfully​, as their experimental procedure involves ​no external              
vehicle. 
Moreover, as Thierry and colleagues describe their experimental set-up, the subjects were            
not dynamically entangled to anything. Participants were only required to press a button             
when the oddball was detected. Stimuli were presented every 800ms and flashed for 200ms,              
regardless of the subjects’ responses. There is no closed causal or sensorimotor loop knitting              
together participants and environment in a single system. There just seems to be ​no instance               
of continuous reciprocal causation or coupling (Clark 1997; 2008: 15-29; Palermos 2014).            
And, in fact, ​contra dynamical views of cognition (Hurley 2001) the participant’s task is              
easily decomposable in a linear sequence of input (stimulus reception) - cognition            
(discrimination) - action (eventual button pressing).​23 
Noticing that a subject’s mastery of cultural practices has to be constantly maintained             
through repeated cycles of interaction with the environment (Hurley 2010: 142-143;           
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a; 2020: 6) does not, in our opinion, alter the dialectical              
23 Roughly the same line of reasoning, it seems to us, holds for the other examples (seeing certain stars as                    
“pointing stars” and phoneme recognition) Kirchhoff and Kiverstein present in favor of the view that cultural                
practices support CVE. We here focus on the experiment by Thierry and colleagues as their experimental                
procedure is clearly described in a peer-reviewed journal. 
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situation. To see why, consider the following analogy. An athlete's muscular tone ​must be              
constantly maintained through repeated cycles of interaction with a culturally shaped           
environment (namely, a gym). But the athlete’s muscular tone is entirely “internal” to the              
athlete. The fact that the “muscular machinery” has to constantly be finessed through             
environmental interactions does not entail that the “muscular machinery” is partially           
constituted by environmental stuff. There seems to be no external vehicle of the athlete's              
muscular tone. A similar conclusion, it seems to us, holds for the athlete’s (or anyone else’s)                
phenomenal machinery too. 
Crucially, this vehicle internalist conclusion strikes us as being entirely consistent with the             
letter ​of Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s overall position. After all, they claim that cultural             
practices play a role in determining the ​expected precision of the various input streams              
(Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: Ch. 5). But, at least on the account PP offers, precision               
estimation is a purely neural affair, which has to do with the sharpening of neural               
representation and the synchronization of neuronal populations (Friston 2012b). Of course, it            
might be the case that precision estimation is ​not a purely neural affair, and that the                
machinery of precision estimation is not purely neural. But if this is the case, then Kirchhoff                
and Kiverstein ​owe us an account ​of extraneural precision estimation. As far as we can see,                
no such account is even sketched in their publications. 
Notice that our vehicle internalist conclusion does not force us to the implausible claim              
that cultural practices ​have no effect whatsoever on a subject’s consciousness. The case of              
phonetic recognition (i.e. how our perception of linguistic stimuli changes based on the             
languages we know) is one clear example of the effects of culture on our phenomenology               
(see also Lupyan ​et al​. 2020 for a recent review). Indeed, the theoretical apparatus of PP                
seems almost ideally suited to account for such effects (see Clark 2016: Ch. 2; Hohwy               
2017b). This is because PP heavily stresses the role of prior expectations (both about the               
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incoming sensory inputs and their precision) in perception, and in particular in determining             
perceptual content. As a nice example, consider the (now widely known) “white christmas”             
experiment by Merckelbach and van de Ven (2001). In this experimental setup, the             
experimenters made their subjects (a number of undergraduate students) listen to a short             
audio track containing ​only random noises. Crucially, however, before the stimulus was            
presented, the experimenters informed the subjects that a recording of “White Christmas”            
was “buried under” the noise. About one third of the subjects reported ​actually hearing the               
song - even if ​no song was actually present. This case nicely illustrates how a mastery of                 
sociocultural practices (in this case, language) can affect a subject’s phenomenology. 
Notice, however, that these effects seem to operate on the ​content of a subject’s              
phenomenology. In Merckelbach and van de Ven’s experiment, for instance, the fact that the              
subjects expected to hear “White Christmas” changed ​what the subject perceived​, not the             
machinery by means of which the subjects perceived.​24 A similar line of thought seems to               
hold for all the examples proposed by Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (i.e. seeing certain stars as               
“pointer stars”, hearing phonemes) and the many cases discussed in (Lupyan ​et al​. 2020). In               
brief, it seems that cultural practices can, at least sometimes, modify the ​contents of one’s               
subjective experience. So, maybe Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s emphasis on cultural practices           
can vindicate (or motivate) some form of externalism about phenomenal ​content​. However,            
externalism about phenomenal content surely does neither entail or support CVE. To begin             
with, contents and vehicles should not be conflated; and, in fact, their conflation is in general                
fallacious (Dennett 1991; Hurley 1998). Secondly, content and vehicle externalism are           
logically independent, and do not entail each other (Hurley 2010; Rowlands 2020). The fact              
that content is determined by extraneural factors does not, in and by itself, entail that the                
24 Of course, there is a sense in which the machinery by means of which the subjects perceived changed when                    
subjects expected to hear “White Christmas” (for instance, by generating some pattern of activity corresponding               
to the expected inputs). But, at least as Marckelbach and van de Ven describe their experiment, all the relevant                   
changes seem to happen inside the subject’s brain. So these changes do not seem to lend any support to CVE. 
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vehicle of said content is extraneural. A teleosemanticist, for instance, holds that content is              
partially determined by ​evolutionary functions (e.g. Millikan 1984); that is, by what a given              
type or device or item was selected for on an evolutionary timescale. However, this view               
clearly does not imply that ​the vehicles of an agent’s mental representation include the              
agent’s evolutionary ancestors (on the pain of absurdity). 
Let us summarize this sub-section. We have claimed that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s            
emphasis on cultural practices does not support CVE. To do so, we have scrutinized one               
paradigmatic case they propose, noticing that, simply put, no ​external vehicle was involved in              
such a case. We also noticed that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s position on cultural practices, at               
least based on how they phrased it thus far, is compatible with vehicle internalism; and that                
cultural practices seem to impact the ​contents of subjective experience, rather than its             
vehicles. 
We close this section with a piece of advice. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a; 2020)              
seems willing to propose a new account of constitution, able to “factor in” the diachronic role                
of cognitive practices in “extending” the conscious mind.​25 We must confess that such an              
account of constitution is still mysterious (at least, to us): we have not yet figured out under                 
which conditions cultural practices are supposed to count as external vehicles of a subject’s              
consciousness. However, if our discussion in this section is correct, it seems to us that               
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein ​do not need such an account. The role of cultural practices in               
shaping a subject’s consciousness seems (at least, ​prima facie​) sufficiently accounted for in             
terms of phenomenal contents. This strikes us as a more promising path of research - one we                 
would gladly trot alongside Kirchhoff and Kiverstein. 
 
25 Importantly, Clark and Chalmers (1998) already noticed that, whereas content externalism tends to focus on                
extraneural factors in a subject’s past, vehicle externalism focuses on the active role external resources play in                 
the ​present​. For this reason, it seems to us that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s focus on the cultural practices a                   
subject took part in in its past naturally suggests that cultural practices might support a form of content, rather                   
then vehicle, externalism. 
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4.2 - The consciousness bloat objection 
In the PP literature, the issues surrounding vehicle externalism (and thus CVE) are             
typically framed in terms of Markov Blankets (Hohwy 2016; Clark 2017). But there seem to               
be many Markov Blankets in the world.​26 Thus, the relevant question is: ​which Blanket              
should we pick to identify the relevant system we are interested in (in our case, the                
phenomenal machinery), and ​why ​should we pick that Blanket over any other? 
As far as we can see, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a; 2019b) adhere to this Markov               
Blanket based framework in their defense of CVE. In fact, they propose a crisp answer to                
both questions. They argue that the relevant Blanket surrounding the phenomenal machinery            
is the wider Blanket that comprises many “smaller”, synchronized Blankets in its innard.             
They also argue that this is the relevant Blanket because its dynamics (i.e. the way in which                 
active and sensory states allow the coupling of internal and external states) acts as an order                
parameter on the “smaller” Blankets it contains, sucking them into a coordinate pattern, as              
mutually interacting components of a single system (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 80-81). 
Now, leave Markov Blankets aside for a moment, and focus on vehicle externalism. A              
prominent objection to vehicle externalism is the so-called “cognitive bloat objection”           
(Rupert 2004; Sprevak 2009). The objection is basically a slippery-slope objection that points             
out that, given the criteria the vehicle externalist proposes to determine whether an external              
item qualifies as a constituent bit of the relevant mental machinery, simply ​too much stuff               
gets counted as a cog in the mental machinery. This leads to unpalatable consequences, such               
as an explosion of the mental states attributable to an agent (e. g. Ludwig 2015), and it is                  
generally taken as a ​reductio​ of the relevant form of vehicle externalism. 
Here, argue that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s position form of CVE is susceptible to             
precisely this kind of objection. More specifically, we argue that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s             
26 Indeed, sometimes it is claimed that the entire planet has its own Markov Blanket (Rubin ​et al​. 2020). 
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way of identifying the relevant Markov Blanket allows to include, as cogs in a subject’s               
phenomenal machinery, ​other subjects​.​27 
To see why this is the case, consider first the (seemingly well established claim) that any                
two PP systems busy modelling each other rapidly fall into generalized synchrony (e.g.             
Palacios ​et al​. 2019). Originally, this point was empirically demonstrated by Friston and Frith              
(2015a; 2015b) through computational simulations. The simulation itself is mathematically          
complex, but the idea behind it can be clearly expressed as follows. Suppose that two agents                
(A and B) partake in a turn based activity, and suppose that they are both busy predicting                 
what the other agent will do in its own turn. Now, when it’s A turn, B will try to predict A’s                     
moves; and, more specifically, the sensory consequences of these moves. But, and this is the               
crucial point, ​A is predicting them too​. For, if PP is correct, in order for A to take a move, A                     
is bound to engage in active inference; and it is thus forced to predict the sensory                
consequences of its own moves. This is why the activity of two mutually predicting PP               
systems will tend to synchronize.​28 
Aside from Friston and Frith’s simulations, there are other threads of evidence suggesting             
that interacting subjects tend to synchronize at multiple levels (see Wheatley ​et al​. 2012;              
Coey ​et al. 2012; Tognoli ​et al​. 2020 for reviews). Ecological psychologists, for instance,              
have long noticed that the limb movement of visually coupled subjects tend to synchronize              
(e.g. Schmidt ​et al​. 1990; Richardson ​et al​. 2005; see also Schmidt and Richardson 2008 for a                 
27 Importantly, there also seems to be something odd with Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s claim that the relevant                 
Markov Blanket identifying a subject’s phenomenal machinery is, by default, placed around the entire embodied               
organism (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 80). For that Markov Blanket includes a multitude of things (e.g.                
kidneys, lungs, toenails) which, at least ​prima facie​, we have no reason to regard as cogs of the phenomenal                   
machinery. Notice that noting this does in no way beg the question against CVE, at least as sensorimotor                  
enactivists conceive it. For, according to the sensorimotor enactivist CVE is established by the dynamical               
entanglement of subject and environment (Hurley 1998). But there seems to be just no meaningful dynamical                
entanglement between, say, a subject and the subject’s toenails. 
28 Of course, their synchronization is not ​perfect​, not even in the idealized simulations proposed by Friston and                  
Frith. For one thing, the two systems are bound to differ on the precision assigned to these predictions see                   
(Friston and Frith 2015a; 2015b).  
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review).​29 Interacting subjects also tend to synchronize their postural sway (Shockley ​et al​.             
2003) and some of their autonomic responses, such as their patterns of pupil dilatation (Kang               
and Wheatley 2017). Indeed, intrapersonal synchronization seems a very pervasive          
phenomenon, so much so that people sitting on rocking chairs tend to (unconsciously)             
synchronize the way in which they rock (Goodman ​et al​. 2005; Richardson ​et al​. 2007).               
Moreover, there is ample empirical evidence (obtained independently from the computational           
framework of PP) that the neural activity of interacting subjects synchronizes (e.g. Stephens             
et al​. 2010; Liu ​et al​. 2015; Jiang ​et al​. 2015 Liu ​et al​. 2016; see Valencia and Froese 2020                    
for a nice review). It thus seems correct to conclude that, when two or more subjects interact,                 
they actually tend to synchronize. 
Consider now the computational simulations presented in (Palacios ​et al​. 2020) and            
(Friston ​et al​. 2015). If correct, these simulations show that when a number of free energy                
minimizing systems interact with each other, they naturally tend to form a wider system, with               
its own Markov Blanket, provided the interacting (i.e. “smaller”) systems have ​at least some              
prior expectation in common. 
But human subjects surely share at least some priors. The prior expectations regarding             
perception are one clear example. For instance, it seems that humans expect natural light to               
illuminate objects from above and slightly on the left (e.g. Mamassian ​et al​. 2002). Or, to                
give but another example, our prior expectations about noses being convex is so strong that it                
can generate the “hollow-face” illusion (i.e. seeing a ​convex face when looking at an              
appropriately illuminated ​concave side of a mask). Broadly speaking, it is widely recognized             
that, on the account of perception PP offers, perceptual systems must be properly attuned to               
29 Notably, this line of research models the limbs of the experimental subjects as interacting pendula. Curiously,                 
the first time generalized synchrony was described (Huygens 1673), it was described as the synchronization of                
interacting pendula. And, just as the limbs of the participants in Shmidt and colleagues’ experiments, Huygens’s                
pendula phase-locked in antiphase. 
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the environmental statistics (e.g. Orlandi 2014; 2016).​30 Hence, it seems that the perceptual             
systems of agents inhabiting the same environment must, broadly speaking, encode the same             
prior expectations. The same holds true if we consider the account of ​action PP proposes,               
namely active inference. According to active inference, at least some, very general prior             
expectations motivating actions (e.g. the expectation of being well-fed) have been hardwired            
in the control system by natural selection, and are thus shared by a great number of agents,                 
humans included (e.g. Friston et al 2012a: 525; 2012b; Sims 2017). Consider, further, the              
account of the mirror system PP offers. On this account, the mirror system stores a model of                 
one’s bodily dynamics, which can be used to predict both one’s action and someone else’s               
action, provided that the target of these predictions is sufficiently “like” the predictor (Kilner              
et al​. 2007; 2011; Donnarumma ​et al​. 2017). If this account is correct, agents that are                
sufficiently “alike” are bound to have some expectation on their bodily dynamics in common.              
Lastly, consider culturally established prior expectations. These practices are said to establish            
regimes of shared expectations among the members of a culture (Roespstorff ​et al​. 2010;              
Constant ​et al​. 2019; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: Ch. 5; 2020). Taken together, all these               
threads of evidence strongly suggest that humans have at least some shared expectations.             
Hence, if the results of the simulations provided by Friston ​et al. (2015) and Palacios ​et al​.                 
(2020) are correct, the interaction of human subjects (which, if PP is correct, are free energy                
minimizing systems) will naturally let a new system, with a “wider” Markov Blanket emerge. 
Now, if that is correct, and if it is correct (as it seems) that interacting human subjects tend                  
to fall into generalized synchrony at multiple scales, then it surely seems correct to say that                
the interaction of human subjects leads to a “wider” Blanket containing multiple “smaller”             
Markov Blanket falling into generalized synchrony. But such a “wider” Blanket is precisely             
the sort of Blanket that, in Kirchhoff and Kiversteins view, identifies a subject’s phenomenal              
30 More specifically, the perceptual system of each species must be attuned to the relevant regularities of the                  
ecological niche the specie inhabits. 
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machinery. Thus, if Kirchhoff and Kiverstein are correct, it seems that anytime two (or more)               
subjects interact with each other, they all end up being counted as constituents parts of the                
phenomenal machinery of each other. This conclusion surely strikes many (the authors            
included) as mildly unpalatable. 
We believe that, on intuitive grounds, such a conclusion is ​so ​unpalatable to constitute a               
reductio of Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s position. To us, the point seems exactly the point              
leveraged by Block’s (1978) famous “China brain” thought experiment. No matter how            
cleverly arranged, ​groups of subjects cannot constitute any phenomenal machinery; and           
surely they cannot (partially) constitute the phenomenal machinery of one of the subject’s of              
the group. 
Now, a foreseeable objection to our claim is roughly the following: ​granted​, Kirchhoff and              
Kiverstein’s (2019a; 2019b; 2020) defense of CVE has intuitively unpalatable conclusions.           
But intuitive unpalatability is not a sign of falisty - there are many intuitively unpalatable, yet                
true, propositions. Moreover, the vehicle externalist can simply ​accept the bloat and call for a               
revision of the relevant underlying metaphysics (Chalmers 2019: 16). After all, vehicle            
externalism ​is a revisionary claim. So it should not be surprising that it has revisionary               
consequences. 
To answer this foreseeable objection, we highlight the following: that Kirchhoff and            
Kiverstein (2019a: 53; 106-107) accept that only ​temporally thick models​31 can be            
consciousness-supporting. That is, they believe that only the vehicles making up temporally            
thick models can qualify as ​phenomenal machineries​. 
Now, recall the heuristic proposed by Friston (2018: 5-6): to determine the temporal             
thickness of a model it is sufficient to consider the time lapsed between successive “visits” to                
some particular states. The longer that time, the more a model will be temporally thick. A                
31 Recall that, in this context, “model” refers to anything enshrouded by a Markov Blanket 
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bacterium, for instance, might revisit a state ​x every half an our. Its model is thus                
significantly shallower than the model a typical human possesses, given that a typical human              
visit certain states only once a year (e.g. throwing a party for one’s own birthday). An                
hypothetical creature that revisits a state only once a century will have an extremely              
temporally thick modal (if compared to us). This means that, in order to be temporally thick,                
a model must pay successive visits to the same states. A temporally thick generative model               
loops though its state space; and the temporal trajectory of that loop is an indicator of the                 
temporal thickness of the model (or so Friston suggests). And if a model traces no loop in its                  
state-space, then it is not temporally thick. 
But, and we believe the following point is relatively uncontroversial, not all human             
interactions have the required loopy structure. Surely ​some human interactions have it: a             
group of friends can meet, say, once every year to commemorate some particular event. But               
other ​human interactions do not have such a loopy structure. Indeed, some human             
interactions are ​one-shot​. Consider, for instance, an applicant's interaction with the           
interviewer during a job interview. Both the interviewer and the applicant share many prior              
expectations, and both are prediction-error minimizing systems. So, if the simulations and the             
empirical evidence discussed above are correct, it seems that their interaction will tend to              
make them synchronize in various ways; and there will be Markov Blanket “surrounding”             
them both. But the model identified though such a Blanket will not re-visit any of its states in                  
the future - typically, applicants and interviewers do not periodically meet to re-enact job              
interviews. So the model they jointly instantiate during the interview will not, according to              
the relevant heuristic Friston proposes, be temporally thick.​32 However, given the way in             
which Kirchhoff and Kiverstein propose to identify a subject’s phenomenal machinery, that            
32 Importantly, the same conclusion seems to hold true even when one considers a more regimented notion of                   
temporal thickness, for instance in terms of a multi-layered model in which each layer predicts the incoming                 
input at a different temporal scale (e.g. Tani 2016: 199-218; Friston ​et al​. 2017). It is not at all clear, for                     
instance, what the various layers should be in the case of the applicant-job interviewer dyad. 
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model is identified as a piece of phenomenal machinery. This, it seems to us, poses a                
dilemma to Kirchhoff and Kiverstein: either the claim that only temporally thick generative             
models are consciousness-supporting is incorrect and oughts to be rejected, or the way in              
which they identify “extended” phenomenal machineries is incorrect, and oughts to be            
rejected. At any rate, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein must give up ​some claim that they endorse,               
regardless of pre-theoretical intuitions on what could possibly qualify as phenomenal           
machinery. 
 
4.3 - DEUTS entails the consciousness bloat 
Recall the general structure of the DEUTS argiment. The first step is a commitment to               
dynamicsm: cognitive processes are often constituted by agent-environment sensorimotor         
interactions. The best way to explain these interactions is through the tools of dynamical              
system theory; but, once these tools are deployed, one is often forced to model the agent and                 
the environment as a single coupled system, whose joint behavior accounts for the production              
of cognitive outputs. Hence, cognitive outputs are produced by an “extended” coupled            
system; just as cognitive vehicle externalism requires (Chemero 2009; Palermos 2014; Hutto            
et al​. 2014; Lamb and Chemero 2018; Kiverstein 2018). 
The second step consists in showing that dynamically entangled subjects cannot be            
phenomenal duplicates ​only by being neural duplicates. If one closely scrutinizes ​how the             
experience of a dynamically entangled subject evolves over time, one notices that it is              
necessary, in order for a given temporally extended experience to be experienced, that agent              
and environment interact in a certain way; and thus that certain environmental features             
qualify as external vehicles of experience. As Susan Hurley magistrally wrote:  
“The subpersonal states and processes that do include all the          
token-explanatory factors, with nothing left out, should in principle be          
duplicable in a different environment. If certain subpersonal states or          
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processes are not duplicable, then they do not include everything that is            
doing token-explanatory work. Something playing a token explanatory role         
has been left out; the boundaries around the token-explanatory states, ​or           
vehicles​, should be expanded. [...] So, oversimplifying for clarity: if a           
vehicle, then duplicable, and if not duplicable, then not the whole vehicle​”            
(Hurley 1998: 331, emphasis added). 
Hence, if at least some environmental factors ​need to be duplicated in order to duplicate a                
phenomenal experience, then the phenomenal vehicles will be partially spread in the            
environment. And this, of course, just is CVE. Crucially, Hurley takes this line of thought to                
provide a ​discriminating way to appeal to the causal spread of cognitive processing (Hurley              
1998: 330). She knew that each and every agent is a node in a massive causal network                 
connecting it to an unruly manifold of environmental features (e.g. the oxygen an agent              
breathes, the chair upon which she seats, the feeble gravitational attraction the star ​Altair is               
exerting upon her, etc); and she knew that ​not all these causal interactions could plausibly be                
counted as constitutive parts of a subject’s phenomenal machinery. That would be a reductio              
of CVE. 
To make her appeal to the causal spreadness of cognitive processing discriminating (that             
is, sensitive to the difference between mere environmental causes and genuine external            
vehicles), she reasoned as follows: vehicles explain the obtaining of any particular mental             
state. The tokening of an appropriate vehicle is what in virtue of which each and every mental                 
state obtains. Hence, what needs to be the case in order for a given piece of phenomenology                 
to be the case is the vehicle of that piece of phenomenology. And, in the case of dynamically                  
entangled subjects, what needs to be the case in order for certain bits of phenomenology to be                 
experienced includes environmental (broadly speaking, extraneural) features. Hence, CVE is          
correct. 
Here, we wish to argue that Hurley’s line of reasoning is not ​discriminating enough​. In               
particular, we wish to claim that DEUTS forces one to identify ​at least some background               
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causal factors as genuine constituents of a subject’s phenomenal machinery. To do so, we              
propose a thought experiment in the style of those discussed by Hurley (1998) herself, and               
briefly presented in this paper in section 3. 
So, let us consider a subject S and its duplicate TS on twin earth. Let us suppose that they                   
are in entirely white rooms; and that, alongside the subjects, these rooms only contain a black                
ball, located at the right of both subjects. The only difference between S’s condition and TS’s                
condition is the amount of oxygen​33 present in the room: whereas S is in a normally                
oxygenated room, TS isn’t. In fact, there is no oxygen in TS’s room. Lastly, let both S and TS                   
be dynamically entangled with their balls: they both want to juggle it in the air. 
It seems clear that, given the proposed setup, the phenomenology of S and TS will diverge                
drastically: whereas S will feel what it is like to play with a ball, TS will feel what it is like to                      
choke to death. Hence, it seems we cannot duplicate S’s experience in TS, if the environment                
does not contain enough oxygen. However, as Hurley wrote: “if not duplicable, then not the               
whole vehicle”. We should thus look for a further factor, the occurrence of which is needed                
for the relevant phenomenology to be experienced. But given the simplicity of the thought              
experiment proposes, that factor can only be the oxygen. And, in fact, were the oxygen               
present in TS’s room, TS too would feel what it is like to play with the ball. So, when oxygen                    
is included, S’s experience can be duplicated. But if the DEUTS argument is correct, this               
implies that the oxygen is part of S’s phenomenal machinery, which surely is incorrect. 
A sensorimotor enactivist willing to defend DEUTS might, at this point, just try and bite               
the bullet. Maybe our thought experiment is the only thought experiment that yields such an               
undesirable consequence. The problem with this line of reasoning, we believe, is that with              
enough creativity ​almost everything ends up being counted as a constituent of a subject’s              
phenomenal machinery. Thus suppose that S and TS are in their white (equally oxygenated)              
33 We chose this example because Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2020:12) clearly state that they do not wish to                  
consider oxygen as a constituent of the phenomenal machinery. 
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rooms, playing with the balls. Suppose now S’s ball was painted with a special paint, which                
emanates the smell of flowers when heated, whereas TS’s ball was not. Since both S and TS                 
are furiously playing with their respective balls, their balls heat up, making S sense the smell                
of flowers. TS, however, feels no such smell. So S’s experience is, again, anot duplicated.               
Paint TS’s ball with the same paint, and the experience will be duplicated. So, if DEUTS is                 
right, that paint is part of S’s phenomenal machinery. Examples of this sort seem ​dangerously               
easy to come by. Bluntly put, the problem is this: the DEUTS argument seems to allow each                 
and every factor which (more or less directly) partially contributes in determining a subject’s              
phenomenology to count as a constituent part of the subject phenomenal machinery. For this              
reason, we claim that the structure of the DEUTS argument fundamentally entails a             
consciousness bloat. For this reason, we also believe, ​pace ​Clark (2009) and Kirchhoff and              
Kiverstein (2019a; 2020), that DEUTS is not the strongest argument in favor of CVE. 
But perhaps DEUTS might be supplemented by some further criterion, which might            
enable one to tell apart genuine constituents from mere causal factors, yielding a better              
defense of CVE? 
We will soon consider (and attack) the two additional criteria proposed by Kirchhoff and              
Kiverstein (2019b; 2020). But before doing so, we wish to highlight the following point.              
Suppose that DEUTS can be supplemented by a further criterion ​C​, which enables a proper               
defense of CVE by telling apart the constitutive bits of a subject’s phenomenal machinery              
from mere causal factors impinging upon a subject’s consciousness. Now, if our analysis of              
DEUTS is on the right track, it seems correct to conclude that what is doing “all the hard                  
work” in establishing CVE is ​C​, rather than DEUTS. That is: if DEUTS does not discriminate                
between constituent and merely causal factors but ​C does, it is ​C what determines whether a                
candidate external vehicle of consciousness ​really counts as a vehicle of consciousness. In             
such a scenario, it seems to us, the DEUTS argument ​per se would be doing no useful work                  
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in establishing and defending the truth of CVE. 
That being said, what are the additional criteria that might save, if not DEUTS, at least                
CVE? To our knowledge, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein propose two further criteria aimed at             
avoiding bloat-style objections. Curiously, they never propose them ​in conjunction​, so we            
will deal with them separately. 
The first criterion is proposed in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019b: 16-18).​34 The idea             
seems to be the following: an external candidate vehicle really qualifies as a vehicle only if it                 
contributes to an agent’s free energy/prediction error minimization over time. As they write: 
“The self-evidencing nature of biological agents blocks the threat from          
cognitive bloat. External resources form a part of an agent’s mind when they             
are poised to play a part in the processes of active inference that keep surprise               
to a minimum over time (i.e. that minimise free energy).” (Kirchhoff and            
Kiverstein 2019b: 17). 
This criterion has some initial plausibility. It surely prevents many ​candidate vehicles            
from being counted as ​actual vehicles of a subject’s phenomenal states. Consider, for             
instance, the objection we raised in section 4.2. There, we claimed that the Markov Blanket               
surrounding two interacting subjects seems to qualify, according to the criteria proposed by             
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, as a subject’s phenomenal machinery. We also highlighted that            
such a conclusion does not sit nicely with Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s claim that only              
temporally thick models can plausibly qualify as consciousness supporting. The problem, as            
we phrased it above, was the following: many interactions among subjects happen ​only once​,              
so the model the two subjects jointly constitute will never revisit some state in the future, and                 
hence it cannot have any relevant temporal thickness. It should be clear how the additional               
constraint required in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019b) blocks our objection: since           
occasional interactions cannot, bing occasional, keep surprised at minimum over time, the            
34 To be fair, in that paper Kirchhoff and Kiverstein ​do not detal with CVE directly, but only with ​cognitive                    
vehicle externalism. But, if DEUTS is correct, cognitive vehicle externalism ​entails CVE, so the relevant               
additional criteria a candidate vehicle must satisfy in order to be properly counted as an external vehicle of                  
cognition seem to at least partially determine whether a candidate vehicle ​of consciousness really counts as an                 
external vehicle of consciousness. 
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putative external vehicles of consciousness involved in these interactions (i.e. other subjects)            
do not qualify as vehicles. Hence, the consciousness bloat is avoided. We see, however, two               
problems with this criterion.  
First, it clashes with the “metamorphosis argument”, whose conclusion Kirchhoff and           
Kiverstein (2019a: 73-76; 2019b) wish to endorse. Even more generally, this criterion clashes             
with the claim that the boundaries of the mind are flexible and always open for renegotiation                
(Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 16). The reason is fairly simple: if the only candidate              
vehicles that really qualify as external vehicles are the ones that keep surprisal at minimum               
over time​35​, then there seems to be just no way to re-negotiate the boundaries of the mind “on                  
the fly”, so as to include some ​temporarily ​relevant external prop in the mental machinery. 
The point can be made more precise in the following way. Consider some paradigmatic              
cases of extended cognition, such as the pressing of the “rotate” button while playing the               
video game Tetris (Clark and Chalmers 1998) or the usage of pen and paper to do math                 
(Wilson 1994). Now, it seems a plain fact that we do not ​always (or even typically) engage                 
with the relevant external props mentioned in those examples when solving cognitive tasks.             
Sometimes (maybe ​most of the time) we do our math “in our head”. And, unless one is a                  
compulsive player of Tetris, it seems very unlikely that the “rotate” button plays a role in                
surprisal minimization overtime. More generally, proponents of vehicle externalism tend to           
stress that our cognitive machinery is opportunistic, recruiting appropriate external vehicles           
“on the spot”, as the need arises (Clark 2008). But the criterion proposed by Kirchhoff and                
Kiverstein (2019b) seems to prevent those external resources from counting as genuine            
external vehicles. 
Secondly (and, perhaps, more problematically), the criterion proposed by Kirchhoff and           
Kiverstein (2019b) does ​not avoid the conscious (or cognitive) bloat. To see why, consider              
35 Or, as Hohwy (2016) would put it, “on average and in the long run” 
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interoceptive ​active inference. If the view of the brain PP offers is correct, brains are               
prediction engines: systems busy predicting the incoming input ​in all modalities​. Importantly,            
this means that brains will not just try to guess the incoming sensory signal in the                
exteroceptive modalities (bluntly put, the five senses traditionally understood); they will also            
try to guess the ​proprioceptive signals (i.e. the “sense” of kinesthesia and self-movement) and              
the ​interoceptive signals (i.e. the “sense” of one ​internal ​bodily state). Albeit typically             
associated with emotional responses (e.g. Seth 2013; Pezzulo 2014; Seth and Friston 2016)             
prediction of interoceptive signals is functionally on a par with the prediction of             
exteroceptive and interoceptive signals.​36 There are thus two general ways to minimize error             
relative to interoceptive predictions: changing the predictions to make them fit the incoming             
interoceptive signal ​or changing the incoming interoceptive signal to make it fit the             
predictions. The latters is ​interoceptive​ active inference. 
A concrete case of interoceptive active inference occurs when humans predict their bodily             
temperature being around 36.6°. When prediction error relative to this prediction ensues, it             
can be minimized through active inference in various ways. For example, one might change              
clothes ​to adjust with the external temperature. Changing clothes will minimize the relevant             
prediction error. And clothes play this role ​overtime​: we humans are more often than not               
dressed, precisely because we need to avoid the surprisaling sensory states that ensue when              
our bodily temperature significantly diverges from 36.6°. It thus seems correct to say that              
clothes are part of the machinery that minimizes (interoceptive) prediction error on average             
and in the long run. And given that Kirchhoff and Kivertein take that machinery to be the                 
machinery of consciousness (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 104; 2020), it seems correct to             
conclude that, on their account, clothes are cogs in our phenomenal machinery. This, to us,               
seems sufficient to conclude that the cognitive bloat objection is not avoided. 
36 So much so, that there can be interoceptive perceptual illusions; see (Iodice ​et al​. 2019) for a nice example. 
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Let us now examine the second anti-bloat criterion proposed in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein             
(2020: 11-12). The criterion revolves around ​counterfactual manipulations​. To understand it,           
recall first that free energy (which, under simplificatory assumptions, corresponds to           
prediction error) is the sum of two quantities: the ​surprisal of a sensory state and the D​KL​;                 
where the D​KL measures of how much the probability distributions encoded in an agent’s              
expectations​37 differ from the ​actual probability distributions defined over environmental          
causes. 
Provided this, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein suggest that we should identify as external            
vehicles of a subject’s consciousness only the elements upon which a counterfactual            
intervention would change the subject’s D​KL and thus the subject’s phenomenology. In their             
view, this simple test is sufficient to tell apart the external factors which are part of a                 
subject’s phenomenal machinery from the ones that merely ​causally interact with that            
machinery (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2020: 12).​38 
We must confess that we do not see how this simple test can help Kirchhoff and                
Kiverstein’s cause, as the D​KL is typically associated with perceptual inference(Wiese and            
Metzinger 2017; Wiese 2018; Bruineberg ​et al​. 2018; Kiefer and Hohwy 2018; 2019). If a               
subject’s correctly determines the external cause of the incoming sensory signals, the            
subject’s D​KL will lower. Conversely, if a subject mis-infers the cause of the incoming signal,               
the subject’s D​KL will rise, as the subject’s “best guess” (technically, the subject’s posterior              
distribution) is not a good approximate of the correct posterior distribution. Now, if this is               
correct, it is obvious to conclude that any intervention on an external cause of the sensory                
37 Technically speaking, they are encoded in the agent’s recognition density. 
38 Kaplan’s (2012) mutual manipulability criterion is another criterion that relies on counterfactual interventions              
to tell apart the genuine constituents of a subject’s mental machinery from factors that merely causally impact                 
that machinery. Importantly, however, Kaplan’s criterion requires at least two counterfactual interventions. In             
his view, for a putative external vehicle to qualify as a genuine constituent of a subject’s mental machinery, it                   
must be the case that “bottom-up” interventions on the putative vehicle end up impacting the relevant                
functioning of the machinery; ​and that “top-down” interventions on the relevant functioning of the machinery               
end up impacting the putative vehicle. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, in contrast, seem only to require “bottom up”                 
interventions on the putative vehicle. So, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s criterion is distinct from Kaplan’s. 
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signal will change a subject’s D​KL​, and presumably the subject’s phenomenology. 
If this is the case, then the criterion proposed by Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2020) is even                
less discriminating than the original DEUTS argument. For, according to the DEUTS            
argument, something qualifies as an external vehicle of consciousness if a subject is             
dynamically coupled to it. According to the DEUTS argument, for something to qualify as an               
external vehicle of consciousness, it must be coupled to the subject through a dense loop of                
continuous reciprocal causation (see Hurley 1998; Palermos 2014; see also Clark 1997). 
But surely such a loop is ​not ​involved in all instances of perception. One can just sense a                  
perceptual object without ​affecting it in any way​. When this happens, surely the perceptual              
object is affecting the perceiver’s sensorium (and neural activity) through some sort of causal              
connection. But there is no causal arrow starting from the subject and landing on the object.                
When we stare at the sunset, we ​do not​ exert any causal power upon the sun.​39 
We thus conclude Kirchhoff and Kiverstein additional criteria do not succeed in rescuing             
the DEUTS argument. 
 
5 - Conclusion 
In this essay, we have examined some aspects of Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s            
DEUTS-based marriage of PP and CVE. We have extensively argued that Kirchhoff and             
Kiverstein’s position is susceptible to a nasty “consciousness bloat” objection, and that their             
emphasis on cultural practices does not contribute to establishing the truth of CVE. 
Importantly, if the arguments we have presented here are correct, it seems correct to              
conclude that, contrary to a popular opinion (e.g. Clark 2009), DEUTS is not the best               
argument in favor of CVE within the sensorimotor enactivists’ arsenal. 
Does this imply that CVE is simply ​false​? No, it does not. There are other arguments in                 
39 Notice that this observation does not imply that no movement is involved in “passive” instances of perception.                  
To continue with the example above, when we gaze at the sunset, we surely perform saccadic eye movements.                  
But these movements do not affect the sun in any way. 
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favor of CVE (Vold 2015; Farkas 2019) which might succeed where DEUTS fails. But, thus               
far, very little attention has been paid to those arguments. Perhaps due to Clark’s (2009;               
2013) ​almost favorable judgment, DEUTS has always been the focus of the debate on CVE               
(e.g. Ward 2012; Pepper 2014). We thus suggest that time is ripe to put DEUTS in retirement,                 
and find some new argument in favor of CVE. If the arguments we presented here are on the                  
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